LLM safety probes that read the model, not just its output
LLM probes, also called activation probes, read harmful-intent signals from a model's hidden states during generation, with no separate guard model to host.
No separate guard model
The signal comes from activations the model already computes
Can stop mid-generation
An inline probe can end a request before the next token is produced
Competitive with guard models
Ahead of WildGuard and LlamaGuard3 on AEGIS 2.0; behind BeaverDam, MD-Judge, GPT-4 and WildGuard on BeaverTails
For models you host
Probes need access to activations, so they won't work on a closed API
Harmful-intent detection
Trained on prompt and response benchmarks that cover intent and response harmfulness, from the hidden states of the model being served.
Start from the probe library
Our unsafe-content probe is published with its benchmarks and known limits.
Or train on your policy
We train custom probes on your model and your own risk categories, and report how they perform.
Run it with Undercurrent
Our open-source runtime attaches probes to LLMs on Hugging Face Transformers or vLLM (experimental).
Benchmark results above are on Llama 3.1 8B, using final-layer activations and binary labels. The WildJailbreak figure uses its vanilla subset, which tests intent rather than adversarial jailbreak techniques. Robustness to an attacker who knows about the probe is untested, and results on other models are measured when probes are trained for them.