Probing the Prefill: Detecting Code Vulnerabilities via Latent Activations
Khatri, A.
Companion writeup to our paper "Probing the Prefill: Detecting Code Vulnerabilities via Latent Activations" (arXiv:2608.16970)
Peer-reviewed papers and preprints from the Wrynx team.
Khatri, A.
Companion writeup to our paper "Probing the Prefill: Detecting Code Vulnerabilities via Latent Activations" (arXiv:2608.16970)
Khatri, A., Prabhu, C.
Video generation models can be coaxed into producing explicit or harmful content with little effort. We trained lightweight probes on the internal latents of CogVideoX to detect unsafe content before a single pixel is decoded — matching 8B guard models at over 1,000× lower latency.
Khatri, A., Prabhu, C., Neogi, O.
We kept running into the same frustration with external guardrails: they're blind. They see tokens — what went in, what came out — but nothing in between. So we asked a simpler question: does the model already know when a prompt is harmful? We trained lightweight probes on LLaMA-3.1-8B's hidden states and found that it does — matching 7B guard models at a fraction of the cost.
Khatri, A.
Activation probes are trained under one inference setup and deployed under another. Across three models and 768 probes, we find they barely notice batch-size and precision changes when reading the prompt — but during generation, the same rounding noise changes the text the model writes, and that is what flips probe verdicts.
Khatri, A., Chan, D. L.
A reproducibility study of latent-space safety probes across model families.